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INSURANCE -

RECENT DECISIONS

FRATERNAL BENEFIT

Poucy -

WHo 1s A

"DEPENDENT''

- Deceased was an inmate of an old age home, having paid an entrance fee
and signed an entrance contract in which the home reserved the right to discharge inmates at any time without reason upon refund of a proportionate
amount of the entrance fee. Deceased lived in the home until his death. He had
taken out a policy in a fraternal benefit association whose by-laws provided that
"In the event of the death of all beneficiaries named in a certificate . • • the
benefits shall be paid ••• [to the] ••. person or persons upon whom the member is dependent ••• sister••••" The home and the sister were the only claimants. Bill of interpleader was brought by the fraternal benefit association. The
home claimed that as the entrance contract was void,1 it was not furnishing
support under a contract and the member was therefore dependent upon it.
Held, deceased was not dependent upon the old age home, which could discharge inmates at pleasure, because the association by-laws mean legal dependency as contemplated by statute and do not include support furnished by
virtue of a contract, or voluntarily without legal or moral obligation. The Maccabees 'lJ. Stone, 306 Ill. App. 468, 28 N. E. (2d) 738 (1940).
Although there is a considerable body of law construing the phase "persons
dependent upon the member," the principal case appears to be the first which
turns upon the the construction of the words, "person or persons upon whom
the member is dependent." However, since dependency is a relationship between two parties, once the existence of a dependent is established it follows
that the benefactor must be the person upon whom he is dependent. The reported cases have developed general rules to determine whether a relationship
of dependency exists and thus are equally in point for construing either phrase.
Four broad tests may be deduced from these cases. First, the relationship of
dependency must exist at the time of the death of the insured member.2 Second,
there must be actual material support,8 although, if it is regular, it may be only
partial support.4 Third, the assistance must be induced by such legal or moral

2. The court did not determine the validity of the entrance contract, as the appellant did not seek to recover by virtue of it and the benefit due under the policy
did not constitute "after-acquired property" which the deceased could have been compelled to transfer to the home if the contract were valid.
2 Martin v. Modern Woodmen of America, l I I Ill. App. 99 (1903); Murphy
v. Nowak, 223 Ill. 301, 79 N. E. 112 (1906).
8 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 208 (1912), and cases there cited.
4 Alexander v. Parker, 144 Ill. 355, 33 N. E. 183 (1893); Martin v. Modern
Woodmen of America, I I I Ill. App. 99 (1903). Trivial or casual assistance is not
sufficient: McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, New England Order of Protection, 153
Mass. 314, 26 N. E. 866 (1891); Royal League v. Shields, 159 Ill. App. 54 (1910).
Nor are occasional presents: Ownby v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, IOI Tenn.
16, 46 S. W. 758 (1898).
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obligation running from the person giving the assistance to the dependent that
the dependent can reasonably expect the assistance or support to continue.5
"Legal obligation" is used in these cases in a special and very restricted sense.
It does not include obligations arising wholly from a contract but only those
arising from a relationship of blood or marriage. 6 The alternative, a moral obligation, is present if there is a promise which the dependent reasonably expects
will be carried out but which is not legally enforceable.7 Fourth, the relationship must not be contrary to public morals. 8 In the principal case, the entrance
agreement expressly reserving the right of the home to withdraw the support
at any time without justification, there was no legal or moral obligation to continue the support, and hence the member could have no reasonable expectation
that such support would continue in the future. As the relationship of dependency
did not exist between the member and the home, the home could not be a
"person upon whom the member is dependent."

5 McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, New England Order of Protection, 153 Mass.
314, 26 N. E. 866 (1891); Royal League v. Shields, 251 Ill. 250, 96 N. E. 45
(1911); Supreme Lodge, New England Order of Protection v. Sylvester, 116 Me.
1, 99 A. 655 (1917).
6 Ryan v. Hefferman, 283 Ill. 429, 119 N. E. 426 (1918). This excludes
servants, boarders and creditors. The contract element of the marital relationship is not
considered as affecting dependency.
1 Wilber v. Supreme Lodge New England Order of Protection, 192 Mass. 477,
78 N. E. 445 (1906). Any relationship which is purely voluntary or based entirely
upon favor, caprice, whim, or a charitable impulse would not meet this requirement.
Supreme Lodge, New England Order of Protection v. Sylvester, 116 Me. 1, 99 A.
655 (1917).
8 ln Duenser v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 262 Ill. 475, 104 N. E.
801 (1914), it was held that if the claimant married the deceased in good faith
the fact that the marriage was void did not make it contrary to public morals. Keener v.
Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 38 Mo. App. 543 (1889), held that dependents should
be restricted to those it was lawful for the deceased to support.

